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COMMENT
NEW YORK - A CITY IN CRISIS: FISCAL
EMERGENCY LEGISLATION AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACKS
I. Introduction
Generous spending and, some would add, fiscal mismanagement
have been a New York City tradition, putting tremendous pressures
on both the City and State budgets. To forestall the deterioration
of the City's financial condition and the subsequent collapse of the
City itself, the New York State Legislature enacted a series of laws,
many of which were feverishly incorporated into the body of State
law in extraordinary session. With the creation of public authori-
ties,' the authorization of State funds to aid these authorities, ' and
State hindrance of the payment of municipal debt service obliga-
tions,3 came inevitable claims in the courts that the State had at-
tempted to circumvent constitutional debt limitations.' The New
York Court of Appeals responded to the constitutional attacks on
the emergency legislation by manifesting, in a series of critical
1. E.g., in May, 1974, the New York State Legislature created the New York City Stabili-
zation Reserve Corporation (SRC), a public benefit corporation authorized to sell bonds, the
proceeds of which were to go directly to the City. N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW §§ 2530-51 (McKinney
Supps. 1975 & 1976). In June, 1975, the Legislature created the Municipal Assistance Corpo-
ration for the City of New York (MAC), authorized to issue bonds, the proceeds of which were
to be used to. purchase City obligations. N.Y..PuB. AUTH. LAW §§ 3030-40 (McKinney Supps.
1975 & 1976). Also in June, 1975, the Legislature provided the administrative skeleton upon
which to flesh out a municipal assistance corporation for any other city requiring one. N.Y.
PuB. AuTm. LAW § 3001-21 (McKinney Supps. 1975 & 1976).
2. E.g., New York State Financial Emergency Act for the City of New York, 1975 N.Y.
LAWS, chs. 868, 869, 870, §§ 22, 23.
3. E.g., New York State Emergency Moratorium Act for the City of New York, 1975 N.Y.
LAWS, chs. 874, 875.
4. The constitutional debt limitation may be altered directly by either constitutional
amendment or voter approval (N.Y. CONST. art. 7, § 11). Public authorities bypass this
limitation by issuing bonds secured by revenues not subject to the taxing power of the
legislature. Hochberg and Taylor, Public Authority Bond Issues: The Need for Legislative
Reform, 21 N.Y.L.F. 183, 185 (1975). See generally, Morris, Evading Debt Limitations with
Public Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 Yale L.J. 234
(1958); Quirk and Wein, A Short Constitutional History of Entities Commonly Known as
Authorities, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 521 (1971).
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cases, a pragmatic, public policy attitude aimed at both the bond
market and the individual investor. An examination of these deci-
sions' and the legislation which spawned the suits' evinces the
court's result-oriented approach toward what is in effect a bridling
of legislative and municipal power.
II. The Legislation
A. The Stabilization Reserve Corporation
With the declaration "that the city of New York is faced with a
grave and unprecedented fiscal crisis which threatens the city's abil-
ity to provide essential services and thereby endangers the welfare
of all the inhabitants of such city,"7 the State Legislature created
the Stabilization Reserve Corporation (SRC) to take effect May 30,
1974.8 This was the first of the legislative devices designed to gener-
ate much needed capital for New York City through the sale of
bonds to the public. Its sole corporate purpose was to finance the
delivery of essential services by the City during its economic dis-
tress9 by funneling proceeds of SRC bonds into the City's general
fund.'"
The SRC was to establish a capital reserve fund" out of which it
was to pay the principal and interest on the bonds it issued. Income
for the fund would be derived from the sale of corporate notes or
bonds, appropriations from the City, and any other sources made
available for this purpose. 2 However, the statute did not compel the
City to make these contributions; the relevant language shows they
5. Wein v. Levitt, 42 N.Y.2d 300, 366 N.E.2d 847, 397 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1977); Quirk v.
Municipal Assistance Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 644, 363 N.E.2d 549, 394 N.Y.S.2d 842, appeal
dismissed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3187 (Oct. 4, 1977); Wein v. Carey, 41 N.Y.2d 498, 362 N.E.2d 587,
393 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1977); Flushing National Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d
731, 358 N.E.2d 847, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976); Wein v. State of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 136, 347
N.E.2d 586, 383 N.Y.S.2d 225 (1976); Sgaglione v. Levitt, 37 N.Y.2d 507, 337 N.E.2d 592,
375 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975); Wein v. City of New York, 36 N.Y.2d 610, 331 N.E.2d 514, 370
N.Y.S.2d 550 (1975).
6. See notes 1-3 supra.
7. N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 2533 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
8. Id. §§ 2530-51 (McKinney Supps. 1975 & 1976). The full title of this enactment is the
New York City Stabilization Reserve Corporation Act. Id. § 2530.
9. Id. § 2533.
10. Id. § 2538.
11. Id. § 2537.
12. Id. § 2537(1).
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were purely discretionary. 3 If the City were unable or unwilling to
provide the SRC with enough money to maintain the capital reserve
fund at an acceptable level, 4 the statute authorized the State comp-
troller to make up the difference by diverting the City's share of the
proceeds from the stock transfer tax directly to the SRC. 5 If the
fund were still deficient, the comptroller could channel to the corpo-
ration incoming per capita state and federal monies designated for
the City. Any appropriations diverted from the City to the SRC
would be credited to the City's share. Thus, directing incoming
funds away from the City per se would not entitle the City to addi-
tional aid." Nonetheless, the SRC was the exclusive obligor on any
debt it incurred: the Legislature absolved both the State and City
from any liability thereon. 7
The mayor of New York was to certify to the SRC the amount
which the City would need to deliver essential services to its citi-
zens. The corporation was then permitted to issue its bonds or notes
to obtain the required funds and deliver them to the City's general
fund." Finally, the act provides for the corporation to be extin-
guished if 520 million dollars in aggregate bonds or notes are out-
standing, issued by either the SRC itself, the City's Municipal As-
sistance Corporation (a public benefit corporation created subse-
13. Section 2537(1)(c) provides:
In order further to assure such maintenance of the capital reserve fund, there shall be
paid by the city to the corporation for deposit in the capital reserve fund ... such
amount, if any, needed for the purpose of maintaining the . . .. fund at the capital
reserve fund requirement . . .; provided that any such amount shall have been first
appropriated by or on behalf of the city for such purpose or shall have been otherwise
made available.
(emphasis added).
Section 2540(a) provides: "Since the corporation's continued discharge of its public and
governmental purpose is of benefit to the city, the city shall pay, within the appropriatiois
available therefor, the expenses of the establishment and continued operation of the corpora-
tion." (emphasis added).
14. The capital reserve fund requirement is defined in the act as that amount needed, as
of a particular date, to pay interest on all of the corporation's outstanding bonds, the principal
.on all corporate bonds coming due on that date, and the sinking fund payments due as of
that date on all outstanding corporate bonds. Id. § 2531(10).
15. Id. § 2540(b).
16. Id. § 2540(c).
17. Id. § 2542.
18. Id. § 2538.
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quent to the SRC), 19 or both together.'
The lack of any absolutely committed source of capital made the
bond market apprehensive about purchasing SRC bonds and notes.
SRC obligations could not be sold. Ironically, a New York Court of
Appeals decision upholding the State constitutionality of the cor-
porate scheme" extinguished any possibility of the obligations be-
ing saleable. The court held that "in no way can the city become
indebted" on the debt service;22 rather, City appropriations were a
permissible gift to a public corporation.23 In light of the overwhelm-
ing risk involved in purchasing SRC bonds, the SRC could not fulfill
its corporate purpose by selling these securities, and thus, dissolved
by its own terms. 4
B. The Municipal Assistance Corporations
In June, 1975 the Legislature authorized the creation of a City
municipal assistance corporation,25 and passed enabling legisla-
tion (the State Act) to provide a model for similar public benefit
corporations,26 partly in response to New York City's fiscal crisis 7
and partly in anticipation of similar situations occuring in other
19. N.Y. PUB. AuTH. LAW §§ 3030-40 (McKinney Supp. 1975), as amended by (McKinney
Supp. 1976).
20. N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW § 2542. See also N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 3033(2) (McKinney
Supp. 1975) (the Municipal Assistance Corporation for the city of New York Act).
21. Wein v. City of New York, 36 N.Y.2d 610, 331 N.E.2d 514, 370 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1975).
22. Id. at 618, 331 N.E.2d 518, 370 N.Y.S.2d 556.
23. Id. at 618, 331 N.E.2d 518, 370 N.Y.S.2d 557.
24. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 2542. The City municipal assistance corporation subse-
quently issued the full complement of bonds allowed to both the SRC and it together. In its
first offering it noted that "[iut is anticipated that, upon the completion of this offering, the
Stabilization Reserve Corporation will not have issued any bonds or notes and that its exist-
ence will terminate." MUNICIPAL ASSISTANCE CORPORATION FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1975
SERIES A BONDS OFFICIAL STATEMENT, July 1, 1975, at 5.
25. Municipal Assistance Corporation for the City of New York Act, N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW
§§ 3030-40 (McKinney Supps. 1975 & 1976) [hereinafter 'the City Act'].
26. New York State Municipal Assistance Corporation Act, N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW §§ 3001-
21 (McKinney Supps. 1975 & 1976).
27. Governor Carey, upon approval of the City Act stated that
New York City .. .is facing a grave fiscal emergency with potentially far-reaching
economic and social consequences for not only its own inhabitants, but for all residents
of the Empire State. The approval of these bills represents a significant first step
towards alleviating the fiscal problems of New York City while at the same time
requiring the City to institute long-range corrective measures.
Governor's Memoranda, 1975 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1745 (McKinney).
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cities in the State." The City Act creates a New York City munici-
pal assistance corporation (MAC) specifically tailored to the exigen-
cies of the City during its emergency period." The State Act deline-
ates a general framework upon which to structure a municipal assis-
tance corporation for any locality which the Legislature finds cannot
meet payment on its municipal securities without interrupting es-
sential services.30
The State Act provides inter alia for a municipal assistance corpo-
ration administered by nine directors appointed by the Governor
with the approval of the State Senate.3 ' The corporation's notes or
bonds are not, according to the statute's term, the obligations of the
state or municipality; rather, they are payable from corporate funds
alone.32 Moreover, the State Act declares these notes or bonds to be
legal securities for public investment purposes.3 To finance the cor-
poration, the statute allows the establishment of both a municipal
assistance tax fund, comprised of revenues from municipal assis-
tance sales and compensating use taxes,34 and a per capita State aid
fund .3
The capital structure of MAC is based on three funds: (1) the
capital reserve fund used to pay the principal on the corporation's
bonds;3 1 (2) the debt service fund used to pay interest on principal
and redemption of MAC's bonds and notes;37 and (3) the operating
fund which covers operating expenses and administrative costs. 38
Money for these funds is derived from State appropriations, the
proceeds from the sale of MAC bonds or notes, and any other ac-
28. "The State Act recognizes the general fiscal emergency confronting certain cities
. . . . Each special law would be tailored to the circumstances of the particular city." Gover-
nor's Memoranda, 1975 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1745 (McKinney).
29. N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW § 3031 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
30. Id. §§ 3002, 3010 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
31. Id. § 3011(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
32. Id. § 3016. Section 3012(c) provides that every note and bond issued is a general
obligation of the corporation.
33. Id. § 3018.
34. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 92-d (McKinney Supp. 1976), as amended by chapter 878,
§ 9, 1977 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1772 (McKinney).
35. See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 92-e (McKinney Supp. 1976).
36. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3036(3) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
37. Id. § 3036(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
38. Id.
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ceptable source.' The primary sources of State contributions" are
the sales and compensating use tax," the per capita State aid,42 and
the stock transfer tax.43 The effect of these State appropriations is
to divert revenues originally designated for City use to MAC's cof-
fers. Thus, the City's total State aid is diminished by what MAC
has received."
39. See notes 39-41 supra.
40. The State has established funds of its own to collect and keep revenues until they
are requested by a municipal assistance corporation: the stock transfer tax fund, consisting
mainly of the proceeds of the stock transfer tax (N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 92-b (McKinney
1974), as amended by chapter 878, § 8, 1977 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1770 (McKinney)); the munici-
pal assistance tax fund consisting of revenues from sales and compensating use taxes and
some per capita aid (Id. § 92-d (McKinney Supp. 1976), as amended by chapter 878, § 9,
1977 N.Y. Sass. Laws 1772 (McKinney)); and the municipal assistance State aid fund, com-
prised of per capita State aid appropriated thereto (Id. § 92-e (McKinney Supp. 1976)).
41. N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1107, 1108 (McKinney Supp. 1976). The sales tax secures both the
First Resolution (see RESOLUTION I, art. II, § 201) and the Second Resolution MAC bonds (see
MUNICIPAL ASSISTANCE CORPORATION FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK SECOND GENERAL BOND RESO-
LUTION (RESOLUTION II), art. II, § 201 (adopted Nov. 25, 1975)).
42. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 54 (McKinney 1974). The per capita State aid secures Resolu-
tion 1I bonds only. See RESOLUTION U, art. II, § 201.
43. N.Y. TAX LAW § 270 (McKinney 1966). The stock transfer tax secures both First
Resolution (see RESOLUTION I, art. II, § 201) and Second Resolution MAC bonds (see
RESOLUTION II, art. II, § 201).
In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977), the Supreme Court
ruled that New York's stock transfer tax was unconstitutional as written. The tax law, as
amended in 1968, gave a distinct advantage to non-residents participating in New York stock
sales. To encourage the sale of securities within the state, the amendment afforded non-
residents a 50 per cent stock transfer tax reduction on sales occurring in New York. Further-
more, the statute limited the total tax liability on a single New York sale to 350 dollars. N.Y.
TAX LAW § 270-a (McKinney Supp. 1976). The Supreme Court found that by imposing a
greater tax liability on out-of-state than on in-state sales of securities, the law fell "short of
the substantially even-handed treatment demanded by the Commerce Clause." 429 U.S. at
332.
As a result of this decision, New York repealed the 50 per cent advantage. Chapter 878, §§
2, 3, 1977 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1762 (McKinney). It also provided for the complete phase out of
the tax by 1981 through a series of gradually increased rebates to the taxpayer. Id. § 6.
Mindful, however, that the stock transfer tax proceeds were designated for MAC, the Legisla-
ture fashioned a system whereby MAC would receive such funds only up to the amount
needed. Id. § 8. Presumably MAC must first turn to the sales tax and, where applicable, the
per capita State aid before tapping the stock transfer tax.
The effect of this diminution of MAC's resources is yet unclear. Nonetheless, commentators
seem untroubled. Arthur Hausker, vice president of municipal securities at Reynolds Securi-
ties, Inc., pointed out that the stock transfer tax is a reserve source available only "to the
extent necessary." Moreover, he projected that both the First and Second Resolution bonds
will be amply secured by the other taxes on which the corporation has a "first lien." Weekly
Bond Buyer, Feb. 14, 1977, at 10, cols. 1 and 2.
44. N.Y. PUS. AUTH. LAW § 3036(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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Both municipal assistance corporation acts reduced the risk on
bonds sold by such corporations by requiring that the State cove-
nant to appropriate particular revenues only to the corporations. 5
While this commitment of funds is not as tenuous as that to SRC,
it still does not commit particular revenues absolutely. Each year
the Legislature must recertify and redesignate these funds to the
municipal assistance corporation;"0 no constitutional guarantee ex-
ists that the Legislature will not eliminate these taxes from which
the funds are derived. Therefore, if the State does not renew the
appropriations, it has at most breached a covenant. 7 Therein re-
mains the risk to the investor.
The keynote provision in the City Act permits MAC to issue its
own bonds or notes in exchange for the City's short-term obliga-
tions, provided the value of MAC obligations does not exceed that
of the City's which it receives. 8 MAC thereupon may deliver these
City securities back to the City, which cancels them without paying
the principal and interest. Thus, the statute in effect shifts the
liability of these short-term debts from the City to MAC.4"
Furthermore, the mayor may certify to MAC that amount needed
to pay the City's operating expenses or the principal, on maturity,
of any of its short-term obligations (within statutory limits). MAC
in turn may pay the City such amount, which would be held in trust
for payment of the City's short-term debt service, or applied toward
45. This covenant takes the form of a general pledge that the State will not limit or alter
the bondholders' rights vested, in the corporation "to fulfill the terms of any agreements made
with" them. Id. § 3015.
46. See N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 3036 (McKinney Supp. 1975) and § 3036-a (McKinney
Supp. 1976). See also MUNICIPAL ASSISTANCE CORPORATION FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1975
SERIES A BONDS OFFICIAL STATEMENT, July 1, 1975, at 7, 8.
47. The first MAC general bond resolution provides that the corporation will default if
"the State Comptroller shall fail to pay to the Corporation . . . for deposit in the Capital
Reserve Fund, the Debt Service Fund or the Operating Fund any amounts . . . as shall be
certified by the Chairman .... " MUNICIPAL ASSISTANCE CORPORATION FOR THE CITY OF NEW
YORK GENERAL BOND RESOLUTION (RESOLUTION I), art. XII, § 1202(c) (adopted July 2, 1975).
Furthermore, the resolution provides that if the State fails or refuses to impose the sales or
stock transfer taxes, or maintain the funds designed as receptacles for these taxes, the corpo-
ration will default. Id. §§ 1202(f), 1202(g).
48. Id. § 3035(1).
49. Id. § 3035(2). Such cancellation and delivery does not apply to notes issued in antici-
pation of bond proceeds (BANs). If MAC delivers these notes to the City, the City must pay
the principal and accrued interest or pay the accrued interest and exchange City BANs of
equal principal and interest rate. Id.
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its operating expenses. Alternatively, MAC may buy City obliga-
tions up to the amount of the City's certified requirement. 0
Finally, in order to ascertain whether the City is complying with
its statutory duties regarding its relationship with the corporation,
MAC may "conduct a review of the records, accounts, budgets,
forecasts, projections and other relevant materials of the city." The
City is obligated to extend its cooperation to MAC investigators,
and must inform MAC of the corrective measures it has taken in
response to MAC directives.5'
C. The Financial Emergency Act
By September, 1975 New York City's financial collapse seemed
imminent. The State Legislature was deeply concerned that the
City would be unable to meet its debt service obligations and thus
be foreclosed from seeking funds in the public markets. In an at-
tempt to bring the City's finances under strict control and assure
continuity of government operations," the Legislature enacted the
New York State Financial Emergency Act for the City of New York
(Emergency Act).53 The Emergency Act provides for a State Emer-
gency Financial Control Board which wields review power over City
operations and control over City funds to ensure that payment of
debt service obligations receives highest priority." The Board is
charged with the duty of reporting on the operations, management
and productivity of the City, recommending corrective measures to
be made in this regard, and obtaining information as to the City's
financial needs and condition.5 MAC, too, has similar input into
the City's management." Neither "review" statute, however, distin-
guishes the Board's functions in this regard from those of MAC, and
a reading of both suggests a duplication of efforts.
The Emergency Act also requires the City to develop a plan,
subject to the Board's review, to confront and alleviate its fiscal
problems. 7 The act further mandates that the public employees'
50. Id. § 3037 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
51. Id. § 3038 (McKinney Supps. 1975 & 1976).
52. Financial Emergency Act, 1975 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 868, sec. 1.
53. 1975 N.Y. LAWS, chs. 868, 869, 870.
54. Id. § 7.
55. Id.
56. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
57. Financial Emergency Act, § 8.
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pension and retirement systems purchase specified sums of MAC
obligations.5" Finally, the Legislature invoked the State police
power to enable the City to obtain prior notice of a person's en-
forcing a debt against it, to obtain a stay against creditors until
the City has developed a plan to prevent default (which plan could
be approved by a State court), and to avail itself of any available
federal relief.59
D. The Emergency Moratorium Act
By October, 1975 the Board had approved a plan which relied on
approximately five billion dollars in anticipated federal aid. 0 How-
ever, when it became evident that these funds would not be received
in time to permit the December 11, 1975 payment of 400 million
dollars in City revenue anticipation notes, the Legislature, in spe-
cial session, adopted the Emergency Moratorium Act (Moratorium
Act)."l
On November 26, 1975, MAC extended an offer to holders of
certain short-term City notes.62 The terms simply offered to ex-
change these City obligations, all scheduled to mature from mid-
58. Id. sec. 7, enacting the Investment of Funds by Pension and Retirement Systems for
Public Employees Act.
59. Id. sec. 19, adding title 6-A to article 2 of the Local Finance Law.
60. See generally MUNICIPAL ASSISTANCE CORPORATION FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK EXTEN-
SION OF TENDER OFFER OFFICIAL STATEMENT (EXTENSION OF TENDER OFFER), Dec. 16, 1975, at
2, "Federal Legislation."
61. New York State Emergency Moratorium Act for the City of New York, 1975 N.Y.
LAWS, chs. 874, 875.
62. These City notes were both revenue anticipation notes (RANs) and bond anticipation
notes (BANs). They were due as shown in Table I:
TABLE I
Scheduled Stated Annual Total Payable
Maturity Interest Rate Type (in millions)
12/11/75 9.50% RANs $ 339.5
1/12/76 9.40% RANs 596.7
2/13/76 7.55% RANs 281.5
3/12/76 8.75% RANs 382.5
$1,600.2
EXCHANGE OFFER To HOLDERS OF CERTAIN SHORT-TERM NOTES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
OFFICIAL STATEMENT (EXCHANGE OFFER), Nov. 26, 1975, at. 3.
This offer did not embrace those City notes held by the eleven New York Clearing House
Banks, and certain City pension funds. Id. at 4. It was scheduled to terminate December 29,
1975. EXTENSION OF TENDER OFFER at 1.
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December, 1975, to mid-March, 1976, for ten-and-one-half-year, 8
percent MAC bonds, interest to be paid semi-annually. 3 For those
who did not avail themselves of this offer, the Moratorium Act
allowed the payment of the stated annual interest on City notes only
up to the date of scheduled maturity. Thereafter, the interest rate
would drop to a flat 6 percent for the duration of the moratorium."4
Furthermore, noteholders would be foreclosed from enforcing any
judgments or liens instituted on account of these short-term City
notes ."
III. The Constitutional Challenges
A. Wein v. City of New York
Leon Wein, in his status as a New York State taxpayer, brought
suit in the State court challenging the SRC, claiming that it lacked
conventional corporate purpose in that it had "no visible means of
financial support except for what it [could] derive from the city,
State or Federal governments.""6 In Wein v. City of New York"
(Wein I), he contended that the SRC was a "mere 'conduit' "66 for
City monies, implying that the corporation constituted a thinly-
veiled attempt to circumvent the faith and credit provision of the
State constitution. This section provides that "[n]o indebtedness
shall be contracted by any . . . city. . . unless such . . . city...
shall have pledged its faith and credit for the payment of the princi-
pal thereon."7
The court rejected this argument, concluding that "such labeling
does not necessarily violate the various aspects of the Constitution
.. .,all of which. . . rest on the assertion that the city has become
indebted or obligated." Inasmuch as the statute did not compel the
63. EXCHANGE OFFER at 1.
64. Id. chs. 874, 875, § 5(B).
65. Id. ch. 874, § 3. The suspension of enforcement provision was to last the duration of
the moratorium, which was a three-year period, to end November 14, 1978. Id. § 2(3).
66. Wein v. City of New York, 36 N.Y.2d at 617, 331 N.E.2d at 517, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
67. 36 N.Y.2d 610, 331 N.E.2d 514, 370 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1975).
68. Id. at 617, 331 N.E.2d at 518, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
69. Id. at 615, 331 N.E.2d at 517, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 554.
70. N.Y. CONST. art. 8, § 2, para. 2. This provision was challenged again in Flushing Nat'l
Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 848, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
See section III-D infra.
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City to pay monies into the SRC capital reserve fund and did not
obligate the City on the SRC's bonds, the faith and credit provision
could not apply.7'
In refuting the argument that the City in fact had loaned its credit
to a public corporation, the court in Wein I cited as controlling" its
decision in Comereski v. City of Elmira.73 In that case, the State
Legislature organized a parking authority in the form of a public
benefit corporation, whose purpose was to operate parking facili-
ties.74 Howev er, the city of Elmira retained control of parking meters
in the facilities. Partial profits from the meters were turned over to
the authority to off-set any deficit and enable it to pay its bonds.
Until the bonds were paid, the city was required to maintain the
parking meters in such a manner as to insure the meters' profit-
ability."
The court in Comereski perceived a clear distinction between the
city's giving or loaning money and giving or loaning credit to a
public corporation for public purposes." Historically, "the Constitu-
tion permits the use of its credit by a local unit only for the purposes
of that unit . . . ." (emphasis added)" However, in neither judicial
precedent nor statutory interpretation was there any sanction
against a gift of money to a public corporation for a "proper" public
purpose.7"
The Comereski court concluded "that a city's non-liability on an
authority's bonds and the same city's right or duty to assist the
authority financially are part of the same conventional statutory
71. 36 N.Y.2d at 617, 331 N.E.2d at 518, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
72. Id. at 618, 331 N.E.2d at 518, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
73. 308 N.Y. 248, 125 N.E.2d 241 (1955).
74. Id. at 250, 125 N.E.2d at 242.
75. Id. at 251, 125 N.E.2d at 242.
76. Id. at 252, 125 N.E.2d at 242-43.
77. Union Free School Dist. No. 3 v. Town of Rye, 280 N.Y. 469, 474, 21 N.E. 2d 681, 683,
(1939).
78. Id. The Rye town supervisor refused to borrow the money needed by the school district
when the funds actually available fell short of the amount appropriated to its use. The New
York Court of Appeals held that "[p]ublic monies should be used for public purposes." Id.
Board of Educ. v. Van Zandt fashioned a test to discern "city purposes": first, look to
legislative intent to find that the purpose of the statute was to insure that public monies
would not be used for private purposes, and second, apply the plain meaning rule. 119 Misc.
124, 126 (1922). For a discussion of the "public purpose doctrine," see Note, 45 Fordham L.
Rev. 860, 879-82 (1977).
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pattern. We should not strain ourselves to find illegality in such
programs.""
Based on the foregoing reasoning, the court in Wein I held that
disbursing a portion of the City's State-aid money to the SRC con-
stituted a statutorily permissible gift "for all purposes." 0 Thus, if
the money given to the SRC were a gift, it could not be a debt
obligation. Both the specific disclaimer in the SRC Act and simple
logic demanded that conclusion.
Judge Matthew Jasen, dissenting, dismissed the technical syllog-
isms. He reasoned that the SRC's de facto dependence on a continu-
ing flow of government funds to insure its existence belied the volun-
tariness of the City's involvement.8 He further agreed with plain-
tiff's premise that the City, straining its debt ceiling to the constitu-
tional limit, created the SRC to borrow indirectly that which it
could not otherwise legally obtain. 2 This circumvention, Judge
Jasen concluded, "violate[d] the spirit and tenor" of the constitu-
tion. 3
B. Sgaglione v. Levitt
In September, 1975, the court of appeals in Sgaglione v. Levitt"'
declared unconstitutional that provision in the Financial Emer-
gency Act which compelled the State comptroller, a trustee of the
State retirement systems, to use 125 million dollars of the systems'
funds to purchase MAC bonds at face value. 5 This enactment was
designed to furnish committed investment money to the City in the
climate of weakening investor confidence.8 Chief Judge Charles
Breitel, writing for the majority, held the provision to be in violation
of the State nonimpairment of pension benefits clause which pro-
vides: "After July first, nineteen hundred forty, membership in any
79. 308 N.Y. at 254, 125 N.E.2d at 244.
80. Wein v. City of New York, 36 N.Y.2d at 619, 331 N.E.2d at 519, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
81. Id. at 621, 331 N.E.2d at 520-21, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
82. Id. at 622, 331 N.E.2d at 521, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 560.
83. Id. at 623, 331 N.E.2d at 522, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 561.
84. 37 N.Y.2d 507, 337 N.E.2d 592, 375 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975).
85. Id. at 511, 337 N.E.2d at 594, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 82. See Financial Emergency Act, § 7,
creating the Investment of Funds by Pension and Retirements Systems for Public Employees
Act. N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. SEC. LAW § 179 (McKinney Supp. 1976) declares MAC securities
to be legal investments for the funds, and further indemnifies all fund investors, trustees, and
fiduciaries from liability arising out of such investments.
86. Financial Emergency Act, § 1.
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pension or retirement system of the state or of a civil division thereof
shall be a contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not
be diminished or impaired."87 Judge Breitel found that implicit
within the protection offered the retirement benefits is a correspon-
ding protection of the funds which guarantee these benefits. By
depriving the trustee of his investment discretion, the FEA section
endangered the funds and ultimately impaired the benefits of the
retirement contract as a whole."8
The court in Sgaglione strained to bring its decision within the
ambit of the "pecuniary benefits" test, heretofore utilized in deter-
mining what constituted a benefit under a State retirement con-
tract.89 This test appears to require a showing of harm by direct
dollar amount as opposed to injury to intangible interests, in order
to establish the impairment of a benefit.
The test was developed in a series of cases, notably in Birnbaum
v. New York State Teachers Retirement System,19 wherein the court
of appeals declared unconstitutional the adoption of an actuarial
table which reduced a member's annuity benefits by nearly 5 per-
cent. The court found that these reduced rates would diminish and
impair the amount of the system's benefits.9 Brown v. New York
State Teachers Retirement System92 reiterated this standard in
holding that statutory dilution of teachers' voting strength on the
Retirement Board was permissible and did not impair the retire-
ment contract. Inasmuch as the pecuniary benefits were already
constitutionally safeguarded, the court concluded that they would
87. N.Y. CONST. art. 5, § 7.
88. 37 N.Y.2d at 512, 337 N.E.2d at 595, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 83. Cf. Subway-Surface Supervi-
sors Ass'n v. New York City Transit Auth., 85 Misc. 2d 695 (1976), where a wage freeze was
upheld by the New York Supreme Court in the face of an article 5, section 7 State constitu-
tional challenge. The court recognized that the impairments clause could not be applied
rigidly. "It has been regarded as a proscription qualified by the power of the States to
maintain order and to safeguard the public welfare." Id. at 698.
89. See, e.g., Kleinfeldt v. New York City Employees' Retirement System, 36 N.Y.2d 95,
324 N.E.2d 865, 365 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1975); Brown v. New York State Teachers' Retirement
System, 19 N.Y.2d 779, 226 N.E.2d 319, 279 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1967); Ayman v. New York State
Teachers' Retirement System, 9 N.Y.2d 119, 172 N.E.2d 571, 211 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1961); Birn-
baum v. New York State Teachers' Retirement System, 5 N.Y.2d 1, 152 N.E.2d 241, 176
N.Y.S.2d 984 (1958).
90. 5 N.Y.2d 1, 152 N.E.2d 241, 176 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1958).
91. Id. at 9, 152 N.E.2d at 245, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 990.
92. 19 N.Y.2d 779, 226 N.E.2d 319, 279 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1967).
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be unaffected by Board representation."
The benefits in Sgaglione were statutorily protected" and incapa-
ble of impairment under the nonimpairment clause. However, the
court found that the comptroller's discretion was an additional ben-
efit entitled to constitutional protection. Central to Sgaglione and
Brown was the issue of diminution of control over the pension funds.
Yet opposite results were reached in these cases, perhaps suggesting
that the Sgaglione court, in spite of its disclaimers, was more con-
cerned with the result than the route which it mapped to achieve
this result. The majority took pains to emphasize the traditional
role of the court. It concluded with a statement, the substance of
which has echoed throughout the fiscal crisis decisions:
Indeed, it should be said that [neutrality] is the primary role of the courts
in the American system in reviewing the constitutional validity of executive
and legislative acts even if they bear the guise, and the courts are convinced
that the guise reflects a reality, of necessity, distress and emergency. The
courts did not make the Constitution; the courts may not unmake the Consti-
tution. 5
Judge Cooke, dissenting in Sgaglione, relied upon the strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality generally afforded legislative acts, an
approach which frequently punctuates his decisions. He maintained
that only pecuniary benefits were entitled to constitutional protec-
tion." Inasmuch as there was no indication that investment in MAC
bonds would deplete the systems' assets, Judge Cooke asserted that
a finding of unconstitutionality was impermissible." The dissent
suggested that the majority was proceeding on a presumption of
unsoundness of the questioned investment, rather than looking to
prior interpretative case law, which would support the dissenting
opinion."
93. Id. at 780, 226 N.E.2d at 319, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 533.
94. N.Y. RETIRE. & Soc. Sac. LAw §§ 16, 316 (McKinney 1971). Section 16 applies to State
employees' retirement funds and mandates that the comptroller file an estimate of the antici-
pated amounts required by the system for the previous year. "Such amounts shall be suffi-
cient to provide for payment in full . . .of all obligations of the state to the retirement
system." Id. at § 16(a). Section 316 applies to policemen and firemen retirement funds and
similarly guarantees the appropriation of sufficient amounts every year.
95. 37 N.Y.2d at 514, 337 N.E.2d at 596, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
96. Id. at 516, 337 N.E.2d at 597, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 86-87.
97. Id. at 517, 337 N.E.2d at 598, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 87-88.
98. Id.
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C. Wein v. State of New York
Six months after Sgaglione the court of appeals in Wein v. State
of New York (Wein II)I" upheld sections 2.2 and 23 of the Emergency
Act which required the appropriation of millions in State monies to
both the City and MAC. These funds were obtained by short-term
State borrowing in the form of tax and revenue anticipation notes.0
Plaintiff charged that these allotments constituted a gift or loan of
the State's credit to a public corporation, in contravention of article
VII, section 8, subdivision 1 of the State constitution, which pro-
vides:
The money of the state shall not be given or loaned to or in aid of any private
corporation or association, or private undertaking; nor shall the credit of the
state be given or loaned to or in aid of any individual, or public or private
corporation or association, or private undertaking . .. .
Although the court found no constitutional violation, it nevertheless
admonished that "the State in avoiding violation has been driven
to the brink of valid practice."'' °
Both plaintiff Wein and the majority perceived the issue to be the
giving or loaning of credit by the State.oa In its analysis, the court
divided the appropriating process into two parts and passed on the
constitutionality of each separately. First, the court noted that
MAC received the State monies in cash and that it is constitution-
ally permissible for the State to give or loan money to aid a munici-
99. 39 N.Y.2d 136, 347 N.E.2d 587, 383 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1976).
100. Id. at 140, 347 N.E.2d at 587, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
101. N.Y. CONST. art. 7, § 8, subd. 1.
102. 39 N.Y.2d at 142, 347 N.E.2d at 588, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 227. Plaintiff argued that the
State was attempting "to do indirectly what it may not do directly," that is, that in effect
the State was giving away money to the City and to MAC. Id. The Wein II court did warn
against this as a general proposition by referring to People ex rel Burby v. Howland, 155 N.Y.
270, 280-81 (1898), wherein the court stated:
When the main purpose of a statute ...is to evade the Constitution by effecting
indirectly that which cannot be done directly, the act is to that extent void, because
it violates the spirit of the fundamental law. Otherwise the Constitution would furnish
frail protection to the citizen, for it would be at the mercy of ingenious efforts to
circumvent its object and to defeat its commands.
39 N.Y.2d at 145, 347 N.E.2d at 590, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 229. However, it found no circumvention
in the instant case.
103. For a summary of legislative motivation to prohibit the State from giving or loaning
its credit to a public or private entity, see Wein v. State of New York, 39 N.Y.2d at 147-48,
347 N.E.2d at 591-92, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 230-31.
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pal corporation.'"4
Second, the State obtained the funds from constitutionally per-
missible short-term borrowing.'"5 The purpose of the short-term loan
was to furnish immediate cash as a temporary replacement for reve-
nues already earmarked but not yet received. Moreover, the borrow-
ing used to fund this assistance is proper when, as here, it is
matched by taxes or revenues incoming within the following year,
assuring a subsequent balance of the liability with the asset., 6
Thus, if the State could not anticipate adequate revenues and taxes
to compensate for the obligations, the debt would be constitution-
ally impermissible.'10
The court cautioned against "rolling over," i.e., issuing new bonds
to meet the deficit of the prior year caused by a previous bond issue.
"'[Riollovers,'" Chief Judge Breitel wrote, are "not consonant
with constitutional limitations or their spirit.' '0 8
In the dissent, Judge Jasen took issue with appropriations being
made in extraordinary session long after the budget was adopted.'0
He agreed that the constitution permits the State to give money to
MAC. However, he noted that it first had to have the money to
give."" Indeed, appropriations are distributed from a finite amount
of money which the State anticipates as income each year. It is thus
104. Id. at 145, 347 N.E.2d at 590, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
105. Id. at 140, 347 N.E.2d at 587, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 226. See N.Y. CONST. art. 7, § 9.
106. Plaintiff, writing a commentary on the New York municipal bond, had harsh words
for this borrowing scheme:
The Constitution intended a minor exception to enable government to deal with cash
flow problems without the formalities required for permanent debt.
However, the short-term exception became a loophole of disastrous propor-
tions. . . .The whole New York fiscal disaster was premised upon short-term borrow-
ing.
.... The revenue that supported the borrowing was a promise by MAC, the no-
assets, no-credit, dummy corporation, to repay the State.
Quirk and Wein, Twilight of N. Y Municipal Bond: Equivocating Judiciary Blamed, Daily
Bond Buyer, June 30, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
107. 39 N.Y.2d at 146, 347 N.E.2d at 591, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 230.
108. Id. at 149, 347 N.E.2d at 593, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 232. The court observed, however, that
the purchase of these RANs authorized by the Emergency Act, although not themselves in
violation of the State constitution, could become violative if such temporary legislation were
used as a launching point for subsequent "rollovers." Id. at 151, 347 N.E.2d at 594, 383
N.Y.S.2d at 233.
109. Id. at 156-57, 347 N.E.2d at 597, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
110. Id. at 154, 347 N.E.2d at 596, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
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anomalous to appropriate money from outside the budget before
there is a source. At that point, the State has only its credit to give.
Judge Jasen characterized the funding as an exchange rather than
a money transaction. In the absence of other purchasers, the State
accepted MAC bonds and City notes. In anticipation of a yield on
these securities, the State issued its own revenue anticipation notes,
which it was able to market through the persuasiveness of its still-
intact credit. Proceeds from the sale of the revenue anticipation
notes constituted the allotments in question."' This, Judge Jasen
concluded, was clearly a giving or loaning of State credit, an implied
guarantee to the State's own noteholders that City and MAC securi-
ties were solid enough to back their investment." 2
The majority concluded, however, that the State did not abuse
its borrowing power "because the State's temporary debt as a part
of the device must be exonerated in the ensuing fiscal year. The
legalities of the device are present so long as the fiscal prospects are
tenable."" 3
Despite the admonition that this borrowing is barely constitu-
tional, the State's scheme may be duplicated. That is, the State
may appropriate outside the parameters of the adopted budget, so
long as the borrowing to fund it will be repaid within one year, is
for the same amount as the appropriation, and in no way interferes
with the existing State budget. The danger in such a device lies in
its potential for abuse, as suggested in Wein II. Nonetheless, this
decision has retained short-term borrowing as a viable means of
obtaining funds for unanticipated State debt.
D. Flushing National Bank v. Municipal A ssistance Corporation
By June, 1976, MAC had made two offers to the general public"4
to exchange its 8 percent bonds due July 1, 1986,"1 and July 1,
1991, ''6 for City notes. Flushing National Bank, a City noteholder,
111. Id. at 154-55, 347 N.E.2d at 596, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
112. Id. at 155, 347 N.E.2d at 596, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
113. Id. at 151, 347 N.E.2d at 594, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
114. Of the 1.6 million dollars worth of RANs and BANs subject to the Moratorium,
approximately 600 million dollars worth were exchanged through both offers. Weekly Bond
Buyer, Nov. 29, 1976, at 5, col. 1. See generally section II-D supra.
115. EXCHANGE OFFER, Nov. 26, 1975.
116. EXCHANGE OFFER TO HOLDERS OF CERTAIN SHORT-TERM NOTES OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK OFFICIAL STATEMENT, May 21, 1976.
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refused the exchange offers and brought suit in New York State
Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the Moratorium
Act under both the United States and New York State Constitu-
tions."7 More specifically, Flushing charged that the Moratorium
Act violated, inter alia, section 2 of article 8 of the New York State
Constitution by relieving the City of its pledge of faith and credit
to back the notes." ' Flushing further challenged the act on the
ground that it impaired the obligation of the noteholders' contract
with the City, in contravention of the federal constitutional provi-
sion which states that "[n]o State shall . . .pass any . . .Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . .,.
The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the Moratorium
Act, emphasizing that the public interest involved outweighed a
rigid application of the contracts clause. 2 ° In addition, the court
noted that the act was passed in an emergency and ultimately did
not relieve the City of its faith and credit obligations.' 2'
The appellate division unanimously affirmed, 22 reiterating that
the debts were to be paid, albeit on a revised schedule.'23 In uphold-
ing the extension of the repayment period, the court emphasized the
State's right to exercise its inherent police powers which repose in
every contract or obligation. It found that these powers were in-
voked properly in view of the State Legislature's findings that New
York City was plummeting rapidly toward financial ruin.'24 Relying
heavily on the United States Supreme Court opinion in Faitoute
Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, the appellate division noted:
117. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 84 Misc. 2d 976, 379 N.Y.S.2d
978 (1975). Plaintiff Flushing National Bank also raised other issues, among them a possible
violation of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, § 83(i), 11 U.S.C. § 403(i). For a discussion of the
implications of this issue had it been considered, see Bond, Municipal Bankruptcy Under the
1976 Amendments to Chapter IX of the Bankruptcy Act, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, at 30 n.171
(1976).
118. This section forbids a city from contracting any indebtedness unless it has pledged
its faith and credit on payment of the debt. Article 8, § 2 was first challenged in the fiscal
crisis decisions in Wein v. City of New York, 36 N.Y.2d 610, 331 N.E.2d 514, 370 N.Y.S.2d
550 (1975), discussed in section rn-A supra.
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
120. 84 Misc. 2d at 980, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
121. Id. at 982, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
122. 52 App. Div. 2d 84, 382 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1976).
123. Id. at 87, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
124. Id. at 88, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 767.
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[I]mpairment of an obligation means refusal to pay an honest debt; it does
not mean contriving ways and means for paying it. The necessity compelled
by unexpected financial conditions to modify an original arrangement for
discharging a city's debt is implied in every such obligation for the very
reason that thereby the obligation is discharged, not impaired.'25
The decision summarily dismissed the challenges based on the faith
and credit clause of the State Constitution whereby the City may
not contract a debt without pledging its faith and credit thereon.
The court merely noted that the mandate of this section had not
been violated by the emergency moratorium legislation.'
In a decision by Chief Judge Charles Breitel, the New York Court
of Appeals reversed the appellate division's affirmance of the special
term's decision,' noting that "[t]he State Constitution prohibits
the city from contracting any indebtedness unless it pledges its
'faith and credit' for the payment of the . ..indebtedness .
and that by foreclosing the short-term noteholders from legal re-
course for at least the moratorium period, the full faith and credit
pledge was rendered meaningless. Having found a violation of the
State constitution the court saw no need to proceed to the federal
constitutional questions presented.'28
Initially, the court looked to constitutional history in its search
for the meaning of faith and credit.' 9 As stated by the New York
State Constitutional Convention of 1938, the purpose of adding the
faith and credit section was to protect "the soundness of local bor-
rowing policies and to preserve and strengthen local credit."'30 At-
tempts to eliminate the pledge in 1967 met with no success.' 3' How-
125. Id. at 89, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 768, quoting Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park,
316 U.S. 502, 511 (1942).
126. Id. at 89, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
127. 40 N.Y.2d 731, 358 N.E.2d 847, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976).
128. Id. at'732-33, 358 N.E.2d at 850, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 24. By not passing on the federal
questions, the court effectively prevented any higher review of its decision.
129. Id. at 734-35, 358 N.E.2d at 851, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 25. For an excellent discussion of
the faith and credit provision as applied to municipal bonds, see Bond, Enhancing the
Security Behind Municipal Obligations: Flushing and US. Trust Lead the Way, 6 Fordham
Urban L.J. 1 (1977).
130. REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
1076, Vol. II (April 5 to Aug. 26, 1938).
131. STATE OF NEW YORK TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION - LOCAL FINANCE, 126-27 (Jan. 12, 1967). The purpose stated for eliminating the faith
and credit provision was to permit localities to issue revenue bonds (those issued in anticipa-
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ever, in neither record did a discussion of the words' literal meaning
appear. In the absence of such commentary, the Flushing court
justified its assumption of the burden of interpretation.' 2
The majority, taking a semantic approach, stated at the outset
that the meaning of the phrase "faith and credit" was clearly under-
stood and thus "must be read in accordance with [its] univocal
meaning." It distinguished between the meanings of "faith" and
"credit" in concluding that the phrase was not careless tautology:
[a] pledge of the city's faith and credit is both a commitment to pay and a
commitment of the city's revenue generating powers to produce the funds to
pay. Hence, an obligation containing a pledge of the city's "faith and credit"
is secured by a promise both to pay and to use in good faith the city's general
revenue powers to produce sufficient funds to pay the principal and interest
of the obligation as it becomes due.'
Acknowledging that few courts have construed the meaning of
faith and credit, the majority borrowed from two Florida State Su-
preme Court opinions and one California Court of Appeals opinion
for its interpretation of the term. In State v. County of Citrus,34 the
county commissioners approved a bond issue in order to repay hold-
ers on a then-outstanding issue."5 Unlike the original issue which
pledged ad valorem taxes in repayment, the replacement bonds
pledged both the ad valorem taxes and the faith and credit of the
county.'36 The Florida Supreme Court pointed out that the faith and
credit pledge is both an acknowledgement of the debt by the obligor
and an undertaking to use good faith to repay the liability promptly.
Such a pledge expanded the county's obligations on the second bond
issue to include a commitment to use other legal sources, in addition
to the ad valorem taxes, to pay the bondholders.'37 As a result the
court concluded that Florida law required voter approval of the
second bond issue.
Faced with another refunding bond issue similar to the one in
tion of revenues and not backed by a faith and credit pledge). Proponents of this elimination
cited greater flexibility in issuing bonds without a public authority as supporting their pro-
posal. Id. at 125.
132. 40 N.Y.2d 735, 358 N.E.2d at 851, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
133. Id. at 735, 358 N.E.2d at 851, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 25.
134. 116 Fla. 676, 157 So. 4 (1934).
135. Id. at 677, 157 So. at 5.
136. Id. at 679-80, 157 So. at 5-6.
137. Id. at 692-94, 157 So. at 10-11.
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Citrus County, the Florida Supreme Court, in State v. City of
Lakeland,' reaffirmed its Citrus County interpretation of faith and
credit.'35 Appellee Lakeland had pledged its full faith, credit and
resources on both an original issue and the refunding bonds. How-
ever, the city sought to add a pledge of "surplus net revenues" to
the refunding bonds to supplement the ad valorem taxes used to
service the obligation.'4 Lakeland argued that these surplus reve-
nues were included implicitly in the faith, credit and resources
pledge on the original bonds, and that the refunding issue was thus
unchanged.' The court concluded that a pledge of faith and credit
"does not create a specific lien on any particular property," but is
instead a general obligation. The new issue, by its surplus revenue
addition, differed from the original agreement' and required voter
approval. The "faith and credit" pledge in Lakeland did not func-
tion as a catch-all to the issue by allowing the pledge of revenues
outside the restrictions of the bond agreement. Instead, it served as
the city's ultimate payment guarantee to the bondholders to call
upon available resources in order to meet its debt service obliga-
tions.
The California Court of Appeals in Sacramento Municipal Utility
District v. Spink4 relied upon the Lakeland decision for its inter-
138. 154 Fla. 137, 16 So. 2d 924 (1943).
139. Id. at 139, 16 So. 2d at 925. Citrus County interpreted faith and credit as constituting
an undertaking by the city to be irrevocably obligated on its bonds.
140. Id. at 138, 16 So. 2d at 924-25.
In the first issue only the ad valorem taxes of the city were pledged. The city sought to
pledge "surplus net revenues" in addition to the ad valorem taxes in the second refunding
issue. These surplus revenues were to come from the operation of the city's water and light
systems, and were to supplement the ad valorem taxes in the event these proved insufficient
to meet obligations on the bonds.
141. Id. at 138-39, 16 So. 2d at 925. The gravamen of both Citrus County and Lakeland
was that if the faith and credit pledge changed the nature of the refunding bonds and
expanded their liabilities, they became new issues subject to new referenda votes. In neither
case were the refunding issues submitted to a vote. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 6, as it existed prior
to the 1968 revision, construed in State v. City of Lakeland, 154 Fla. 137, 139, 16 So. 2d 924,
925 (1943), and State in County of Citrus, 116 Fla. 676, 681-82, 157 So. 4, 6 (1934), provided
in pertinent part that "[tihe Legislature ... shall have power to issue bonds only after the
same shall have been approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election in which a
majority of the free holders who are qualified electors . . . shall participate . . .; but the
provisions of this act shall not apply to the refunding of bonds issued exclusively for the
purpose of refunding of the bonds of [electors'] Municipalities .
142. State v. City of Lakeland, 154 Fla. 139, 16 So. 2d 925.
143. 145 Cal. App. 2d 568, 303 P.2d 46 (1956).
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pretation of faith and credit as applied to municipal bonds.' Sacra-
mento obtained voter approval for revenue bonds issued to finance
the development of hydroelectric generating facilities. These bonds
were backed by a full faith and credit pledge of the Municipal
Utilities District. In addition, the bonds were secured by a lien
against all gross revenues of the District. But the District already
carried heavy indebtedness, including over ten million dollars in
bonds issued in 1938.'11 Inasmuch as all revenues would be pledged
to the second issue, the officials who refused to execute the issue
argued that holders of 1938 bonds essentially would be deprived of
repayment because of the diversion of funds by the second issue
from the original issue.'46 The district court found that the obliga-
tions on the 1938 bonds, unlike those on the bonds in question, were
not secured by any specific funds, and that the faith and credit
pledge did not limit its import solely to specific revenues. Thus, the
contract on the 1938 bonds was held not impaired, as their faith and
credit pledge expressed only that the city would use good faith to
produce the revenues when due.'47
In Cirtus County, Lakeland, and Sacramento, each successive
court reinforced its interpretation by reliance upon its immediate
predecessor. The court of appeals in Flushing brought these issues
together and crystallized the doctrine of faith and credit. Since
Flushing, a faith and credit pledge appears to require an entity to
pay its obligations absolutely. Moreover, the pledge is not limited
to specific revenues or property committed by the entity; but re-
quires the governmental unit to seek beyond its specifically obli-
gated funds on property for the means to pay debts secured by the
pledge.
The Flushing majority drew the distinction among revenue obli-
gations (those "limited to a pledge of revenues from a designated
source"), moral obligations (those backed by only a moral commit-
ment to pay), and the faith and credit or general obligations.'48 Chief
Judge Breitel averred that the faith and credit or general obligations
are those supported by an unconditional payment promise made by
144. Id. at 577, 303 P.2d at 54.
145. Id. at 570-71, 303 P.2d at 49-50.
146. Id. at 575, 303 P.2d at 52-53.
147. Id. at 575-76, 303 P.2d at 53.
148. 40 N.Y.2d at 735, 358 N.E.2d at 851-52, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
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a government taxing entity and pledging its full faith and credit,
but "not includ[ing] obligations not so supported that they are to
be repaid only from specified sources [i.e. revenue obligations]
... ,,"I Applying this reasoning, the faith and credit obligation
emerges as a most solemn constitutional pledge of a municipal ent-
ity's fiscal wherewithal, more encompassing than either the revenue
or moral obligations.
The majority did not imply that if the notes were not paid out of
designated funds, the entire revenues of the City would lie exposed
to noteholders. It pointed to the protection of section 2 of article 8
of the State constitution providing that any tax or revenue anticipa-
tion obligations not retired within five years must be paid out of
special appropriations for that purpose. If the municipality fails to
do so, it must allocate a sufficient sum for repayment from the first
revenues it thereafter receives. 50 This provision, the court con-
cluded, reinforces the premise that the State constitution compels
payment on City indebtedness by demonstrating the existence of a
specific remedy on outstanding obligations for the defaulting mu-
nicipality. 5' -
The majority, therefore, declared that the faith and credit pledge
requires that the indebtedness in question be paid when due, "even
if tax limits be exceeded."' 52 By extending the repayment period on
149. Port of New York Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497, 504 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Here the appeals court looked to Congressional intent in defining "general obligations" as
cited in 12 C.F.R. § 208.109(d) (1967).
150. N.Y. CONST. art. 8 § 2, para. 4. This section provides that:
[p]rovision shall be made annually by appropriation by every . . . city . . . for the
payment of interest on all indebtedness and for the amounts required for . . . (b) the
redemption of certificates or other evidence of indebtedness . . . contracted to be paid
in such year out of the tax levy or other revenues applicable to a reduction thereof,
and (c) the redemption of certificates or other evidence of indebtedness issued in
anticipation of the collection of taxes or other revenues, or renewals thereof, which are
not retired within five years after their date of original issue. If at any time the
respective appropriating authorities shall fail to make such appropriations, a sufficient
sum shall be set apart from the first revenues thereafter received and shall be applied
to such purposes.
151. 40 N.Y.2d 736-37, 358 N.E.2d at 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
152. 40 N.Y.2d at 737, 358 N.E.2d at 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 27. New York City is prohibited
by the State constitution from contracting "indebtedness for any purpose or in any manner
which, including existing indebtedness, shall exceed" 10 percent of the full value of its real
estate. N.Y. CONST. art. 8, § 4(c). The Legislature may not restrict the City's power to levy
taxes on real estate up to the allowable percentage, if the proceeds are to pay for the principal
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City notes three years beyond their due date, the Moratorium Act
sanctioned the City's disregard of the pledge. If the Act were left
standing, the court continued, the moratorium period could be ex-
tended indefinitely "until all the noteholders [would] take MAC
bonds 'voluntarily' in exchange for their notes."'53 The court found
no support for such a proposition.
Judge Cooke, the sole dissenter in Flushing, argued that the faith
and credit pledge was merely one element of the contract, and a
reneging on that pledge by the City would give rise to a breach of
contract action.'54 Whereas the majority viewed the faith and credit
issue in a vacuum, Judge Cooke integrated it with an impairment
of contracts concept. He further reasoned that the strong presump-
tion of constitutionality of a state statute had not been given the
proper weight. 5 '
Judge Cooke ostensibly read the Citrus County, Lakeland and
Sacramento cases more broadly than did Chief Judge Breitel. He
referred to essentially the same passage from Lakeland as did the
majority:'
[t]hat the issuing government agrees to be generally obligated to pay the
indebtedness out of all the government's revenues, rather than restrictively
obligated only from specific revenues; [the faith and credit pledge] ex-
presses an undertaking by the government to be irrevocably obligated in good
faith to use such of its resources and taxing power as may be authorized or
required by law for the full and prompt payment of the obligation according
to its terms.'57
However, the dissent focused on the term "undertaking" as imply-
ing a good faith attempt to pay, rather than a compelled, absolute
and interest on contracted debts. Subject to this bar, the Legislature is free to restrict the
City's power of taxation and contracting indebtedness. Id. art. 8, § 12. A city which has
contracted a debt must appropriate annually funds sufficient to meet its debt service. If the
authorities fail to do so, the required amount must come out of "the first revenues thereafter
received and . . .be applied to such purposes." Id. art. 8, § 2. See text accompanying note
150 supra. See also Quirk v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 644, 363 N.E.2d 549, 394
N.Y.S.2d 842, appeal dismissed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3187 (Oct. 4, 1977), discussed in section III.-
F infra.
153. Id. at 738, 358 N.E.2d at 853, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 27-28.
154. Id. at 747, 358 N.E.2d at 859, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
155. Id. at 744, 358 N.E.2d at 859, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 31.
156. See 40 N.Y.2d at 735, 358 N.E.2d at 851, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 25, citing State v. City of
Lakeland, 154 Fla. 137, 139, 16 So. 2d 924, 925 (1944).
157. Id. at 746, 358 N.E.2d at 858, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 32.
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payment. He asserted that "[a] faith and credit pledge simply
means that the issuing government agrees to be generally obligated
The dissent maintained that any failure of the municipality to
provide for payment on the obligations gives rise to an action for
breach of contract. Such an approach requires, therefore, that the
surrounding panoply of contractual terms be considered before a
decision on the breach be rendered. Whereas the majority ab-
stracted the faith and credit element as being outside of, and natu-
rally higher than, the contract, the dissent perceived faith and
credit as but one term of the contract to be weighed equally with
all others. The contravening consideration in this case, according to
Judge Cooke, was the legislative finding of a "grave public emer-
gency" in the City. He concluded that the faith and credit "pledge
can be honored only if the viability and resources of the city are
preserved and that the continuation of essential services is vital
''259
Judge Cooke argued that there exists in the police power a consti-
tutionally allowable release from the rigid enforcement of municipal
debt contracts.6 " This police power is inherent in every contract; it
is the right reserved to the State to maintain the health and welfare
of its citizens "notwithstanding interference with contracts."'' He
maintained therefore that "the insertion of the faith and credit
pledge into the contract could not possibly, nor did it purport to,
immunize or insulate the entire contract, or even a part of it, from
a valid exercise of the police power by the State."'62 Although the
police power must be wielded constitutionally, "there is no proscrip-
tion against or limitation of the police power in respect to city in-
debtednesses which embrace a pledge of faith or credit - in section
2 of article VIII .... ,,163
158. Id.
159. Id. at 747, 358 N.E.2d at 858, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
160. Id. at 754, 358 N.E.2d at 863, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 38. But see Sturges v. Crowninshield,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819) wherein Justice Marshall stated that a contract is an agreement
to do or not to do something, which agreement is binding in the law. This agreement gives
rise to the obligation on the contract. Therefore, any law discharging the agreement must
impair it. Id. at 197. See also Emergency Moratorium Act, 1975 N.Y. LAws, ch. 874, sec. 1.
161. Id. at 749, 358 N.E.2d at 860, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
162. Id. at 748, 358 N.E.2d at 860, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
163. Id. at 754, 358 N.E.2d at 863, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
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The dissent then discussed the effects of the contract clause.
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell"4 is the key case
upon which the dissent based this argument. In that case, a Minne-
sota moratorium .law allowed the postponement of sales of fore-
closed property and the extension of redemption periods during an
economic emergency."' Faced with a challenge that the law im-
paired contractual obligations, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the law, declaring that the integrity of the mortgage indebt-
edness remained untouched. During the moratorium, the Court con-
tinued, the mortgagee still had the right to title and could still
obtain a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor. However, in
light of the financial exigencies of the 1930s, the state could use its
"protective powers" and justify interference with contracts.'"
"While emergency does not create power, emergency may furnish
occasion for the exercise of power."' 67 The Supreme Court concluded
that the reservation of state power appropriate to such extraordi-
nary conditions may be deemed to be as much a part of all con-
tracts, as is the reservation of state power to protect the public
interest . . . ."'" Thus Blaisdell set forth a test to reconcile the
contract clause with the state's police power. It required a court
first, to consider the reasonableness of the legislation,'69 and second,
to balance individual rights against public welfare. 70
During the 1930s, New York passed a similar law which froze both
mortgage foreclosures and any legal remedies to collect thereon,
provided that taxes and interest were paid on the property. 7' The
164. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
165. Id. at 416.
166. Id. at 425.
167. Id. at 426.
168. Id. at 439.
169. Id. at 437. See also Bond, Enhancing the Security Behind Municipal Obligations:
Flushing and US. Trust Lead the Way, 6 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1, 16-19 (1977).
170. 290 U.S. at 442.
171. Act of May 3, 1933, ch. 745, 1933 N.Y. LAWS. In its statement of findings and policy,
the State Legislature declared the "existence of a public emergency affecting the health,
safety, and comfort of the people requiring the provisions of this act, .... " In view of the
substantial number of defaults on mortgages, and an awareness that immediate liquidation
of such mortgages would "demoralize" the real estate market, the Legislature declared it
"essential for the public interest to provide a procedure under which such. . .mortgages...
may be liquidated in an orderly manner and under which the assets of the guaranty corpora-
tions may be administered and conserved equally and ratably in the interests of holders of
mortgage investments." Id. at Section 1.
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New York Court of Appeals upheld this legislation in the face of
challenges by security holders, first in Klinke v. Samuels' "to pre-
vent . ..extensive evils and suffering," and similarly in Maguire
& Co. v. Lent & Lent, Inc.'" In 1945, this law was tested in the
United States Supreme Court in East New York Savings Bank v.
Hahn' and emerged unscathed. The bank had attempted to fore-
close on a mortgage, the principal on which had become due in 1924.
However, under the New York Moratorium Law foreclosure was
prohibited on mortgages executed prior to July 1, 1932. This provi-
sion was renewed annually.'75 In holding that the law did not violate
the contracts clause of the United States Constitution, the Court
pointed out that the State's power, when otherwise justified, is not
"diminished" simply because a private contract is affected.," The
Court applied the Blaisdell reasoning, giving highest regard to legis-
lative discretion in determining the use of the police power, and
concluding that "the police power . . . is an exercise of the sover-
eign right of the Government to protect the . . . general welfare of
the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between
individuals."'" Thus, the police power is an element implied in
every contract and must be treated as though explicitly written into
it.178
In none of the foregoing cases did the legislation in question deny
the obligee's rights on the contract; rather, it merely postponed the
remedy to enforce those rights. The Flushing majority stated that
"denial of remedy is [equivalent to the] denial of the right,' 79
172. 264 N.Y. 144, 190 N.E. 324 (1934). The court noted that limitation on the remedy is
fixed:
There being no market for real estate of any kind, and the banks refusing to loan money
on the best of real estate security, owners were caught . . . in a trap due to conditions
over which no one had control and for which no relief was at hand. Value was in the
property but the value could not be obtained nor anything like it. To prevent worse
and more extensive evils and suffering, the Legislature had asked through these laws,
for security holders to wait a reasonable time for universal economic conditions to
improve, provided interest and taxes are paid.
Id. at 149, 190 N.E. at 326.
173. 277 N.Y. 694, 14 N.E.2d 629 (1938).
174. 326 U.S. 230 (1945).
175. Id. at 230-31.
176. Id. at 233.
177. Id. at 232-33.
178. Id.
179. 40 N.Y.2d at 736, 358 N.E.2d at 852, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 26.
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citing W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh.' In Worthen the Arkansas
legislature extended from sixty-five days to six and one-half years
the minimum time before which property securing Municipal Im-
provement District bonds could effectively be seized. Additionally,
if the creditor/mortgagor were to take possession, the law required
a two and one-half year postponement of the debt with no require-
ment that the debtor show inability to pay.' Moreover, the penalty
for nonpayment of interest was reduced, and the statute was not
limited to a period of economic emergency.'82 The Worthen Court
noted that while in Blaisdell the mortgagor nonetheless was obliged
to pay rent on the property possessed, in the case before it the
creditor's right was diminished to virtually nothing. The Court thus
concluded that there was no reasonable relation between the terms
of the statute and its stated objective." 3
Ostensibly, City noteholders are in a situation more closely analo-
gous to Blaisdell mortgagees than Worthen creditors, in that the
noteholders continue to receive interest during the three year re-
demption moratorium. The purpose of the EMA "suspending" leg-
islation arguably has as legitimate an end as did the moratorium in
Blaidsell; i.e., the most fundamental and immediate necessity of
providing essential services to keep the life blood of New York flow-
ing.
Furthermore, in Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 4 the
Supreme Court recognized that necessity may compel the revision
of a city's debt discharging arrangements. This modification was
held not to constitute an impairment of contracts requiring a refusal
to pay, but simply a means of ultimately discharging the obligation.
Trying to find an alternative to municipal bankruptcy, the City of
Asbury Park, a seashore town which had overexpanded, submitted
its management to a state-created Municipal Finance Commission.
The Commission formulated a plan of adjustment requiring that
city bonds and coupons be transformed into new securities without
holders' consent.8 5 "The necessity compelled by unexpected finan-
180. 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
181. Id. at 61.
182. Id. at 59.
183. Id. at 63.
184. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
185. Id. at 503-04. Note, however, that the Asbury Park plan of adjustment called for the
opportunity for the creditor to be heard by the state court and for the court to approve any
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cial conditions to modify an original arrangement for discharging a
city's debt is implied in every such obligation .... "I"
The Flushing majority realized that its decision could have harsh
ramifications for the already beleagured City and thus did not im-
mediately impose the injunction and peremptory mandamus re-
quested by Flushing National Bank. The opinion cautioned the City
that the noteholders should be given their remedies in short order,
indicating that the Legislature would be in session shortly after the
decision was to be handed down. The City was given until the end
of March, 1977, to repay the notes held by private citizens. Six
months thereafter, the remainder was to be paid to institutional
noteholders. 7
petition for recomposition. Id. at 504-05. The New York Moratorium Act, on the other hand,
foreclosed the City noteholders from any judicial review of their right to payment.
186. Id. at 511. See also United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) which
struck down repeal of a covenant guaranteeing the security bondholders; McTamaney,
United States Trust Company of New York v. New Jersey: The Contract Clause in a Complex
Society, 46 Fordham L.R. 1 (1977).
187. 40 N.Y.2d at 741, 358 N.E.2d at 855, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 29. The court decided that:
[iln order to minimize market and governmental disruptions which might ensue it
would be injudicious at this time to allow the extraordinary remedies in the nature of
injunction and peremptory mandamus sought by plaintiff. Plaintiff and other note-
holders of the city are entitled to some judicial relief free of throttling by the morato-
rium statute, but they are not entitled immediately to extraordinary or any particular
judicial measures unnecessarily disruptive of the city's delicate financial and economic
balance.
Id.
On January 14, 1977, almost two months after Flushing was decided, the court of appeals
granted an extension on the remittitur to February 3, 1977. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal
Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 1088, 360 N.E.2d 1075, 392 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1977). On February
8, 1977, the remittitur was signed, and the court of appeals rendered a memorandum decision
proposing a timetable for the repayment of the City notes, essentially that within thirty days
after the noteholder has submitted proof of present ownership or custodianship of the notes,
full payment must be made on those notes. Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance
Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 1094, 360 N.E.2d 1106, 393 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1977).
Shortly thereafter, on February 28, 1977, the New York State Supreme Court Justice,
James Gibson, appointed to administer the City noteholders' claims, refused to allow Flush-
ing National Bank and all other noteholders similarly situated to receive interest during the
moratorium period at the face value on the notes. The bank wanted to continue to receive
the original interest beyond the maturity date, instead of the statutory 6 percent. The court
said that forbearance on the higher interest rate is "vital to the rehabilitation of [the City's]
critical fiscal situation." Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 88 Misc. 2d
1047, 1049, 391 N.Y.S.2d 969, 970 (1977).
For a concise explication of the rights of the noteholders after the moratorium, see
EXCHANGE OFFER TO HOLDERS OF CERTAIN SHORT-TERM NOTES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
OFFICIAL STATEMENT, March 22, 1977, at 10.
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The immediate effect of the Flushing decision is to require pay-
ment to those who were most poignantly injured by the EMA - the
small investors. 8 ' But perhaps the opinion's more crucial signifi-
cance is its impact on the bond industry. Had the court upheld the
moratorium, there would always be lurking the risk that at any
moment of financial difficulty, a bond's terms would be subject to
alteration, prompted less by economic stringencies than political
expediency.' 5
E. Wein v. Carey
In Wein v. Carey (Wein III),110 Wein returned to challenge the
State's good faith in maintaining a balanced budget during fiscal
year 1976-77.111 This case harkened back to Wein II,112 where the
plaintiff challenged the State's issuance of revenue anticipation
notes to finance 500 million dollars in appropriations to the City and
MAC. Although the Wein II court held that such borrowing was
constitutionally permissible, its finding was premised upon such
borrowing not disrupting the balance of the budget.' 3
In Wein III, the plaintiff claimed that in recent years the State
had issued similar anticipation notes and had failed to repay them
within the year of issue. Rather, the State had included this debt
in the subsequent year's budget, thereby creating a deficit carry-
188. It is arguable whether holders of MAC bonds who exchanged them for City notes are
entitled to any redemption of those notes similar to that for MAC bonds. The Flushing
opinion did not specifically deal with the issue.
Arthur Richenthal, counsel for Flushing National Bank, stated that bondholders made the
decision to exchange their notes with full knowledge that they may be waiving their rights
and knowing that the constitutionality of the moratorium had been challenged. "It appears
at this stage that they voluntarily relinquished their rights," he stated. Wall St. J., Nov. 22,
1976, at 4, col. 3.
However, as early as the first exchange offer, the Official Statement contained the opinion
that "if such holder exchanges his City Notes pursuant to this Exchange Offer he would
probably be deemed to have relinquished any rights to judgment on or enforcement of the
City Notes exchanged." ExcHANGE OFFER at 12.
189. One commentator, responding to the Flushing decision, said: "It seems already to
have had a salutary effect on the municipal bond market. More important, it restores one's
faith in the inevitability of rational and just solutions. It refutes those who insisted that black
is white." Weekly Bond Buyer, Dec. 6, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
190. 41 N.Y.2d 498, 362 N.E.2d 587, 393 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1977).
191. Id. at 500, 362 N.E.2d at 589, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
192. Id. at 502, 362 N.E.2d at 590, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
193. See section III-C supra.
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over year after year.'94 Wein inferred from this apparent pattern of
State financing that these deficits were constructively "planned def-
icits," in violation of the constitution's balanced budget mandate.' 5
The court first rejected plaintiff's argument that the State should
bear the burden of proving its good faith effort to maintain a bal-
anced budget.' 9 The court further noted that in attempting to sus-
tain his burden, plaintiff relied on a succession of budget deficits,
which were wholly circumstantial evidence and therefore here inad-
equate proof.' 7
In its decision, the court examined the feasibility of New York
State proceeding to the end of its fiscal year with its budget still
intact. It considered that reasonably unanticipated economic condi-
tions could affect the budget, and concluded that "[t]here must,
as a practical matter, in every year be either a deficit or a surplus."
Moreover, the court hypothesized that even if the prior deficits were
ill-disguised rollovers, they would not ipso facto invalidate the cur-
rent budget because the notes still had to be paid.' 8
The decision in Wein III suggests the futility of a taxpayer ques-
tioning the State's budget in a judicial forum for want of ability to
obtain sufficient evidence. The court reminded potential challeng-
ers that if the State had the burden of justifying its good faith in
fiscal matters, the State would be subject to defending frivolous
suits at a cost which neither the State nor the taxpayer could af-
ford. 99
F. Quirk v. Municipal Assistance Corporation
William Quirk and others who did not exchange their long-term
City bonds for short-term MAC notes,90 charged that their rights as
bondholders were impaired under both the United States 0' and New
194. 41 N.Y.2d at 502-03, 362 N.E.2d at 590, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
195. Id. at 503, 362 N.E.2d at 590-91, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 958-59. The New York State
constitution requires that the State budget be balanced when approved by the Legislature
for each new fiscal year. A planned deficit is impermissible; that is, no new budget may be
unbalanced at its inception. N.Y. CONST. art. 7, § 2.
196. 41 N.Y.2d at 503, 362 N.E.2d at 590-91, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 958-59.
197. Id. at 504-05, 362 N.E.2d at 591-92, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 959-60.
198. Id. at 504, 362 N.E.2d at 591, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 959.
199. Id. at 504-05, 362 N.E.2d at 591-92, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
200. Quirk v. MunicipalAssistance Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 644, 363 N.E.2d 549, 394 N.Y.S.2d
842, appeal dismissed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3187 (Oct. 4, 1977).
201. Plaintiffs allege that the diversion of the proceeds of certain City taxes from the City
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York State constitutions."2 They alleged that the State, in diverting
the proceeds of the stock transfer and City sales taxes from the City
to MAC, reduced the revenues available to pay City bondholders
and thereby diminished their fiscal position while enhancing that
of MAC noteholders. 20 3
The court of appeals dismissed these contentions by pointing out
that there was no provision in either the State constitution or else-
where committing these specific taxes to payment of the bonds.
Without the commitment, there is no obligation to be impaired
under the federal Constitution.0 4
The Quirk decision in no way removed that last vestige of protec-
tion which the bondholders still possessed. The court assured plain-
tiffs that the State constitution provides for the appropriation of
funds to pay the bonds "from the first revenues . . . received" by
the City. Moreover, the faith and credit pledge functions as addi-
tional insurance guaranteeing that the bonds will be backed.2 5
The court reminded the bondholders that their right to be paid
does not embrace a right to designate which revenues the City will
direct toward payment of the obligation.2 6 The court is apparently
unwilling at this time to impose any further strictures on the City
in its debt service. After the Flushing decision, wherein the court
articulated the expansive parameters of the faith and credit obliga-
tion, the court seems reluctant to impose its judicial sanctions on
the manner in which the City activates the court's prior mandate.
G. Wein v. Levitt
In a "hold-harmless" provision similar in form and effect to those
to MAC impaired their contracts under the United States Constitution, article I, § 10, pre-
sumably by diminishing the source of funds available to pay their notes.
See note 188 supra, as to the rights of those who accepted the MAC exchange offers.
202. N.Y. CONST. art. 7, § 2, provides for a "first lien" on revenues to pay bonds on which
an insufficient amount was originally set aside.
203. 41 N.Y.2d at 646, 363 N.E.2d at 550, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 647, 363 N.E.2d at 550-51, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
206. Id. The effect of the decision on the bond industry is best reflected in the performance
of MAC bonds in the market. "Trading in MACs picked up after the news [of the decision]
hit the Street with some bonds gaining more than one point." Daily Bond Buyer, April 27,
1977, at 1, cols. 2-3. Then-mayor Abraham Beame was quoted as saying that Quirk "removes
any lingering shadow of uncertainty concerning this necessary financing mechanism." Id. at
2, col. 2.
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included in the MAC statute, the Legislature indemnified trustees
of the State Insurance Fund (the Fund) from liability on invest-
ments in certain State public benefit corporations. 27 Just as the
Legislature required the public employees' pension and retirement
systems to invest in MAC securities,0 9 it mandated a similar invest-
ment for the Fund.209 The Legislature perceived this mandate to be
a practicable, viable solution to the need for infusion of capital into
MAC. Accordingly, the Legislature further required the Fund to
purchase securities from investment-poor public benefit corpora-
tions ("buildout authorities"). 210 While the indemnification for
MAC investments was to be financed by the Fund itself, indemnifi-
cation for authorities' investments was to be paid directly by the
State. Plaintiff Wein argued 21 that via the hold-harmless clause,
the State in effect contracted a debt in contravention of article 7,
section 11 of the State constitution providing that "no debt shall be
hereafter contracted by or in behalf of the state, unless such debt
be authorized by law, for some single work or purpose, to be dis-
tinctly specified therein." Such law must be submitted to a referen-
dum vote. 2t2
In its majority opinion, the court classified State spending in two
ways: first, that which is needed to maintain the day-to-day opera-
tion of the government;2 13 and second, that which is "created by
long-term borrowing and bond obligations." ' The court reasoned
that the indemnification in issue falls into the former category be-
cause it is simply a cost of doing business and therefore found no
207. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 87-c (McKinney Supp. 1976). See N.Y. PuB. AUTm. LAW
§ 3020(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975) which indemnifies directors, officers and employees of the
municipal corporation for any act or omission made within the scope of his authority. Such
"hold-harmless" clause is a general provision in the State municipal assistance corporation,
incorporated by reference into the MAC legislation.
208. See section rIn-B supra, for a discussion of Sgaglione v. Levitt, 37 N.Y.2d 507, 337
N.E.2d 592, 375 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1975), which declared unconstitutional the New York State
Financial Emergency Act sections 22 and 23, which required the State Comptroller to invest
a specified amount of pension funds in MAC bonds.
209. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 87-a (McKinney Supp. 1976).
210. See 1976 N.Y. LAWS ch. 115 (McKinney).
211. Wein brought suit against the State Comptroller, Arthur Levitt, in Wein v. Levitt,
42 N.Y.2d 300, 366 N.E.2d 847, 397 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1977).
212. Id. at 302-03, 366 N.E.2d at 848, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
213. Id. at 304, 366 N.E.2d at 849, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
214. Id.
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article 7, section 11 violation. 15
For procedural reasons, the court did not pass upon plaintiff's
claim that the provision constituted a prohibited loan of the State's
credit to a public corporation,21 but it did discuss the issue in dic-
tum. This constitutional section"7 is the same one reviewed in Wein
118 Unlike the financing scheme in the earlier case, where plaintiff
argued that the loan of credit ran to a public corporation, the in-
demnification provision in Wein III creates no obligation to the
authority itself. Instead, the State is obligated to only the trustees
of the investor Fund."' The majority concluded that "[i]f the pub-
lic corporations default, they will wallow in their own tragedy, with-
out benefit of state credit vis-a-vis the indemnification provision. 220
Chief Judge Breitel, stepping away from his role as the voice of
the majority, dissented. He opened his dissenting opinion with the
pronouncement that "[t]his appeal involves another of the fiscal
gimmicks used during the state and municipal financial stringency
in 1975.221
He argued that the indemnification provision was indeed a loan,
albeit indirectly, of the State's credit to the authorities. 22 Appre-
ciating the economic effect of the provision, Chief Judge Breitel
perceived the loan to occur in two steps: first, the State insured a
flow of each into the authorities to buoy them above sinking level;22 1
second, the State, through indemnification of the officers of the
investor, assumed their liability, which would be measured by the
amount of losses sustained by the authority's default. Thus, if the
authority fails, the State would ultimately have to pay.2
However valid this hypothesis may be, the benefit of the State's
credit, if indeed it is characterized as credit at all, still runs to the
215. Id. at 305, 366 N.E.2d at 849, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
216. In his complaint, Wein raised only the New York Constitutional article 7, § 11 claim.
Inasmuch as the case was before the court on a motion for summary judgment, the court may
look only to the pleadings and affidavits for the issues to be decided. Id. at 305-06, 366 N.E.2d
at 850, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
217. N.Y. CONST. art. 7, § 8.
218. See text accompanying notes 99-113 supra.
219. 42 N.Y.2d at 306, 366 N.E.2d at 850, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
220. Id. at 307, 366 N.E.2d at 851, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 309, 366 N.E.2d at 852, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 309-10, 366 N.E.2d at 852, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
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Fund and not the authority. If the authority defaults on its bond
obligations, and if those having an interest in the Fund successfully
sue its officers, then the State will have to pay the losses.225 One
factor influencing the majority in its decision was the unlikelihood
of the success of such a suit, due to both the indemnification provi-
sion and a legislative declaration that buildout authority securities
"are reasonable, prudent and proper" investments."'
Nonetheless, this scheme can hardly be deemed any more of an
indirect loan of State credit than the appropriations financing in
Wein I. There, the public purchased State securities in reliance on
the State's faith in the integrity of the revenues guaranteeing the
public's purchase. The State's faith in the bonds was evidenced by
its purchase of them at a time when few others would. If the major-
ity in Wein II perceived the connection between the State and MAC
as being too remote to constitute a loan of credit, then it was like-
wise correct in holding that the relationship between the trustees of
the corporation's creditors and the corporation itself as too atten-
uated to fall within the scope of the constitutional limitation.
IV. Conclusion
Upon a review of the foregoing cases, it is questionable whether a
trend in constitutional interpretation can be discerned. In Wein I
and II, the court of appeals applied a rule of strict construction to
the relevant statutes, even though implying in Wein II that the
State had stretched its legislative elasticity to the breaking point.
On the other hand, the constitutional reasoning applied in
Sgaglione seems attenuated. There the court not only strictly con-
strued the term "benefits," but also went further to conclude, albeit
impliedly, that the comptroller's discretion was a benefit.
The court of appeals has taken a result-oriented approach to the
City's financial emergency cases. The crucial consideration underly-
ing these decisions seems to be whether the constitutional problems
created by the legislation can be remedied without undue hardship
to those deriving rights therefrom. Had the court invalidated the
SRC, and thus the bonds issued thereunder, the bondholders would
have been left holding worthless paper with no governmental back-
225. Id. at 306, 366 N.E.2d at 850, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
226. Id. at 304, 366 N.E.2d at 849, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
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ing - a harsh result.27 In addition, the withdrawal of 750 million
dollars of State funds from the City and MAC could have resulted
in the calamitous collapse of the City and MAC, leaving the City
and MAC securities holders with, at best, an "empty right to liti-
gate" their remedies. Likewise, characterizing the trustee indemni-
fication provision common to public corporations and authorities as
an operating expense eliminated the need to submit such a provi-
sion to a referendum vote.
On the other hand, the finding that the comptroller could not be
compelled to invest retirement funds in the City and MAC securi-
ties merely resulted in diversion of this money to other solid invest-
ments, thereby ensuring the funds' continued yield. By abrogating
the Moratorium Act, the court restored investor confidence in mu-
nicipal securities and established that a pledge of an entity's faith
and credit is its ironclad guarantee that bondholders have a right
to be paid and a right to contest any unilateral State interference
with these rights. Finally, upholding the right of the State to divert
its aid from a governmental entity to a public benefit corporation,
the court has retained a flexible financing scheme eminently useful
for a city's changing economic status.
The foregoing decisions illustrate the court of appeals' public pol-
icy approach to a significant economic problem. The court appears
to have rejected an approach grounded in strict adherence to prior
case law in favor of one based on an awareness of the current and
future fiscal repercussions of its rulings. In these cases, the court has
fulfilled a function frequently ignored in comfortable adherence to
stare decisis - a function reflected in the maxim that the court is
a barometer of change. A court must be flexible enough to adminis-
ter to the challenges presented by novel legal problems, and such
flexibility must be tempered not only with the application of pre-
cedent but also with a sensitivity to public attitudes, and economic
realities.
Gayle Gutekunst-Roth
227. Most likely, the upholding of the SRC's validity is an academic exercise. Because of
uncertainties inherent in the corporation's structure, the bonds were already encountering
great difficulty in the market at the time the decision was rendered. See text accompanying
notes 12-17 supra.
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